Abstract. Differential privacy is a strong privacy notion based on indistinguishability of outputs of two neighboring datasets, which represent two states of one's information is within or without of a dataset. However, when facing dependent records, the representation would lose its foundation. Motivated by the observation, we introduce a variant of differential privacy notion based on the influence of outputs to an individual's inputs. The new notion accurately captures the weakening of the dependent records to the privacy guarantee of differential privacy. Our new privacy notion gets on well with the differential privacy. When the individuals are independent, we prove that a mechanism that satisfies ǫ-differential privacy would ensure to satisfy the new privacy model. When the individuals are dependent, we prove that the group privacy method to achieve differential privacy in dependent case can be used to achieve the new privacy model. When the dependence extents of the sources are weak, there exists differentially private mechanism which can satisfy the new privacy model with noise magnitude far less than the one of the group privacy based method. These results imply that the new model inherits (almost) all of the mechanisms of differential privacy. Finally, our new privacy model fits in well with the information theory. We prove that if one mechanism satisfies the new privacy notion, the mutual information of one individual to the mechanism's outputs would be upper bounded by a small valued. This implies that the rationality of our new model is based on the information theory.
Introduction
The governments and companies in the world are trying the best to collect our data [1, 2] . Our income data, medical data, online shopping data, online searching history, even the amount of water or power we used every day [3] , are all collected by all sorts of these entities. To these entities, our data is their gold ore in which they can mine a lot of valuable information. To ours, however, all of our life is monitored: When we use the Google search engine, we are monitored by Google; When we use Google Maps, we are monitored by Google; When we walk around, we are monitored by the monitors in every street corners. It seems that there are limited ways to prevent these collections [2] . Therefore, our only choice is just hoping these entities may not abuse our data. However, how to correctly use these data without leaking personal private information is not a simple problem since it is not previously clear whether the analysis results contain sensitive information traceable back to particular individuals [4, 5] . How to use or publish data while preserving the privacy of individuals contained in dataset is then a vital problem, which spurs the research field of the privacy-preserving data mining or privacy-preserving data processing. There are currently many privacy protection models [6, 7] . The current hotspot about privacy research is around differential privacy [7] . The model is popular, since it offers both provable privacy guarantee and practical algorithms to achieve it. Furthermore, the application of differential privacy in the iOS 10 by the Apple company makes differential privacy enter into the public's field of vision 4 . In this paper, we give an extension of differential privacy model to treat the problems appeared in related works [8, 9, 10] . Our focus is the ability of differential privacy to treat the dependent data [11, 12, 10] . The classic differential privacy model, in general, assumes that each individual's data is represented as a record and the privacy is captured by the notion of neighboring datasets, which represent two states of an individual's information is within or without of a dataset. The above representation implies the assumption that records of different individuals are independently generated respectively [13, 8] . However, the assumption are too strong to be hold in reality. For example, the search histories of the parties within a (small) social network would be highly dependent. Due to this reason, differential privacy faces many criticisms [8, 9, 10] .
There are currently many works to extend the classic differential privacy model to treat dependent records. These works are mainly based on either the Bayesian inference method [14, 9, 15, 16] or the group privacy method [11, 12, 17] . The Bayesian inference method tries to model the background knowledge of adversaries, such as the dependent records, and then designs some policies to defend the dependent records attacks. One major drawback of the Bayesian inference method is that the models based on which do not inherit most of the results of differential privacy and therefore are hard to be implemented [14, 9, 15, 16] .
The group privacy method combines the dependent records as a new record and then the newly allocated datasets would satisfy independent assumption [17] . The differential privacy mechanisms are then applicable for the new datasets. One drawback of the group privacy method is that the number of dependent records should be small. Or else, the method will add very much noise to outputs. In order to reduce the noise needed in the group privacy method, the papers [12, 11] introduce two variants of the group privacy-based model. However, the later two models fall short of the theoretical foundation, which will be discussed in detail in Section 7.
Therefore, a new treatment about dependent records problem is promising. The new privacy model should both solves the dependent records problem and inherits most of the results of differential privacy. There are currently many examples about the drawback of differential privacy in treating dependent records [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17] . The most famous and mostly cited one is the "contagious disease example" which is firstly used in [8, Example 2.1]. We now revisit the example and rewrite it as the following example. Example 1. Bob or one of his 9 immediate family members may have contracted a highly contagious disease, in which case the entire family would have been infected. An attacker who knows all 9 family members have this disease already has strong evidence that Bob is infected. An attacker who knows nothing about the family's health can ask the query "how many in Bob's family have this disease". The true answer is almost certainly going to be either 0 or 10. Suppose Laplace(1/ǫ) noise is added to the true answer and that the resulting differentially private query answer was 12. The answer 12 is e 10ǫ times more likely when the true answer is 10 (and hence Bob is sick) than when the true answer is 0 (and Bob is healthy). Thus data correlation and a differentially private answer produced a result where an attacker's probability estimate (of Bob being sick) can change by a (large) factor of e 10ǫ , which is greatly larger than the expected e ǫ .
Almost every papers about dependent records analyze Example 1 in the manner similar as above. In this paper, we treat it in a different and formal way. Our observation is that differential privacy is based on indistinguishability of outputs of the two neighboring datasets, which represent two states of one's information is within or without of the dataset. However, when facing dependent records, the representation would lose its foundation. Motivated by the observation, we do not use the notion of neighboring datasets to capture privacy problems but borrow the notion of influence of outputs of mechanism to an individual's inputs (or in other words, mutual information) to capture privacy problems. The details are as follows.
We can model each individual as a random variable X i . A dataset can be modeled as an instantiation of all the individuals X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ). A mechanism M takes a dataset x as input and outputs a random variable Y valued on a domain R. The mechanism M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy if, for any two datasets x, x ′ differing on at most one record and any r ∈ R, there is
where
The above representations are in line with the papers [18, 19] . We formalize the Example 1 as following. For notational simplicity, we assume Bob has only one immediate family member.
Example 2. Let t 1 denote the state of infecting the disease and let t 2 denote the state of not infecting the disease. Assume there are two individuals X 1 , X 2 , each of which is represented as a random variable following the Bernoulli distribution which outputs one of t 1 , t 2 with probability p(t 1 ) = 0.1, p(t 2 ) = 0.9. Set X = {t 1 , t 2 }. Assume that every datasets have two records, each of which is generated by one of the individuals X 1 , X 2 , respectively. Then, the set of assignments of X = (X 1 , X 2 ) is Z = {z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 }, where
The query function f is to count the number of infected individuals, i.e., the number of t 1 , in a dataset. We have
Assume M is an ǫ-differentially private mechanism.
We now consider the relation between the event Y = 2 and the individual X i . Intuitively, if the event Y = 2 contains very little information of the individual X i , the privacy of X i would be preserved. Specifically, we compare the quantity
Pr[Xi=t2|Y =2] to the quantity
Pr [Xi=t2] . If the two quantities are very different, the event Y = 2 would contain much information of X i . We have
(1) If X 1 , X 2 are independent random variables, we have
Since M is ǫ-differentially private, there is Pr[M(t 1 , t) = 2] ≤ e ǫ Pr[M(t 2 , t) = 2] for all t ∈ X . We then have
The above inequality can be explained as, if X 1 , X 2 are independent, then the event Y = 2 would have influence on X i with multiplicative magnitude no more than e ǫ . This means that the differential privacy model preserves privacy of X i when X 1 , X 2 are independent.
We next consider the equation (1) when X 1 , X 2 are dependent. We assume that X 1 , X 2 can only have the same value, as they can only infect disease simultaneously or none. Then
Assume that M is the Geometric mechanism [20] (the discrete version of the Laplace mechanism), we obtain
The above equation can be explained that, if X 1 , X 2 are dependent, the influence of Y = 2 to X 1 would possibly be e 2ǫ , which is significantly larger than the expected e ǫ . Therefore, in the dependent case, the ability of differential privacy to protect privacy is weakened.
From the above analyses we can see that, in the dependent case, in order to improve the privacy guarantee of differential privacy, one should set the value
no larger than e ǫ . In section 3, we will formalize the above observations and present our new model.
Contribution
Our contributions are as follows.
-We present a new privacy model: identity differential privacy model. This model captures the weakness of differential privacy in treating dependent records and can accurately explain how the ability of differential privacy to protect privacy is weakened by the dependent records. -We prove the following results, which show that the identity differential privacy model inherits most of the results of differential privacy model.
• If the individuals are independent, satisfying ǫ-differential privacy would ensure ǫ-identity differential privacy.
• If the (k) individuals are dependent, satisfying ǫ/k-differential privacy would ensure ǫ-identity differential privacy.
• If the dependence extents of the sources are weak, there exists differentially private mechanism which can achieve identity differential privacy with noise magnitude far less than the one of the group privacy based method. -The new privacy model is based on the information theory. We prove that the outputs of the privacy model contain very small information about each participated individual. Specifically, the mutual information of the outputs of the privacy model and each individual is controlled to be a small quantity.
Preliminaries

Notations
. . , n}. In this paper, unless noted otherwise, any set is not a multiset. Let z 1 represent the ℓ 1 -norm of the real vector z.
The Generation of Datasets
In our model, there are n individuals, each of which is modeled as an information source and therefore is modeled as a random variable as in information theory [21, 22] . Each individual randomly generates records according to a probability distribution. The details are as follows. Let the random variables X 1 , . . . , X n denote n individuals. Let X i denote the record universe of X i and let F i be the probability distribution of X i . The probability distribution F i is called the profile of X i . A dataset is a collection (a multiset) of n records r 1 , . . . , r n , where r i ∈ X i denotes the one generated by X i . We differentiate a record sequence (z 1 , . . . , z n ) from a dataset {z 1 , . . . , z n } the sequence corresponds to: the former has order among the records but the later does not. The universe of record sequences Z is defined as Z = {(z 1 , . . . , z n ) :
We remark that D is not a multiset, in which the same elements are merged as one element. There may be several record sequences which correspond to the same dataset. We call the dataset {z 1 , . . . , z n } as the dataset of the record sequence (z 1 , . . . , z n ). For a dataset y ∈ D, let
denote the set of record sequences corresponding to the same dataset y and call D y as the sequences set of y.
Definition 1 (Dataset Random Variable). Let X 1 , . . . , X n , Z and D be denoted as above. Then the Z-valued random vector X := (X 1 , . . . , X n ) is called as the dataset random variable of the sources X 1 , . . . , X n . Let F (x), x ∈ Z denote the probability distribution of X. For any y ∈ D, set
Therefore, X can also be seen as a D-valued random variable with the probability distribution F (y), y ∈ D.
The dataset random variable X is used to model the randomness of generating datasets. Note that the dependence of records can be explained as the dependence of the corresponding random variables (information sources).
For notational simplicity, in the following of this paper, we assume Z and D are both discrete. There is no essential difference for other settings, which will be presented in the full paper.
Differential Privacy
we use the histogram representation x ∈N |X | to denote the dataset x, where the ith entry x i of x represents the number of elements in x of type i ∈ X [23, 7, 24] . Two datasets x, x ′ ∈ D are said to be neighbors (or neighboring datasets) if x − x ′ 1 = 2. Two record sequences x, x ′ ∈ Z are said to be neighbors if their corresponding datasets are neighbors. As noted in Section 1, a mechanism M takes a record sequence x ∈ Z as input and outputs a random variable Y valued in a domain R. In this paper, for any mechanism M and any x ∈ D, set M(y) = M(z) for any two y, z ∈ D x . Therefore, for a dataset x ∈ D, we set M(x) = M(z) for any z ∈ D
x . Differential privacy characterizes the changes of outputs when one's record in a dataset is changed. These changes are captured by the notion of the neighboring datasets (or the neighboring record sequences). For the dataset universe D and a query function f , let R = {f (x) : x ∈ D}.
Definition 2 (ǫ-Differential Privacy [25, 13, 7] ). Let X, Y, D, Z, R be denoted as above. Let P(R) denote the set of all the probability measures on R.
, and all r ∈ R, there is
, and where we abuse the notation M(x) as either denoting a probability distribution in P(R) or denoting a random variable following the probability distribution.
Note that Definition 2 is the same as those in [18, 19] , which is also equivalent to the definition of differential privacy as in [25, 13, 7] .
Two Lemmas
The following lemma will be used frequently in this paper.
(β0x+β1) 2 , by which the claims are direct.
Proof. We only prove the equation
The other equation can be proved similarly. Since
Then, we have
On the other hand, the equation (9) is equivalent to
Therefore, the equation (9) holds. The proof is complete.
The Model of Identity Differential Privacy
In this section, we introduce a new differential privacy model: identity differential privacy. As discussed in Section 1, the new model tries to capture the weakness of differential privacy model when treating dependent data and tries to strengthen it. We formalize the discussions in Section 1 as the following model.
Definition 3 (Identity Differential Privacy
A mechanism M satisfies ǫ-identity differential privacy with respect to X if for each X i , any two records t, t ′ ∈ X i and any r ∈ R, there is
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The mechanism M satisfies ǫ-identity differential privacy if and only if, for any X i , any t, t ′ ∈ X i and any r ∈ R, there is
Proof. The proof of the theorem is similar with the equation (1). We have
(13) The claim is therefore an immediate result of the equation (13) .
We now give the composition property of identity differential privacy.
Proposition 1 (Composition Privacy). Let X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) be the dataset random variable. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let the mechanism M i satisfies ǫ iidentity differential privacy with respect to X and let Y i be the output random variable of M i . For any source X j , let the random variables Y 1 , . . . , Y k be independent conditioned on X j , i.e., for any t ∈ X j and any r i ∈ R i , i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, there is
where R i is the domain of Y i . Then, the compositional mechanism
. . , Y k ) and r = (r 1 , . . . , r k ). We have
Since Y 1 , . . . , Y k are independent conditioned on X j , then
Furthermore, since M i satisfies ǫ i -identity differential privacy, we have
Hence
The claim is proved.
Relation with Differential Privacy Model
Differential privacy has the following relation with identity differential privacy.
Proposition 2. Assume the sources X 1 , . . . , X n are independent. If the mechanism M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy, then it satisfies ǫ-identity differential privacy.
Proof. Since the sources are independent, the equation (11) is equivalent to
On the other hand, since M is ǫ-differentially private, we have Pr[M(t,
. Therefore, the left side of the equation (18) is less than
which obviously equals e ǫ . The claim is proved.
The next proposition says that, if the sources are dependent, we can use the group privacy property of differential privacy to achieve ǫ-identity differential privacy. The group privacy method is used extensively to improve the ability of differential privacy to protect privacy for dependent data [11, 12, 17] as noted in Section 1.
Proposition 3. Set k ≤ n. Assume that any one source is independent to at least other n − k sources. Assume also that M satisfies ǫ/k-differential privacy. Then M satisfies ǫ-identity differential privacy.
Proof. First, we have
LetX (i) ,X (i) denote the sources which are independent to and dependent to the source X i respectively. Letx (i) ,x (i) andX (i) ,X (i) denote one assignment and the universe ofX (i) ,X (i) respectively. Then
For onex (i) , set Mx (i) = maxx
Since M satisfies ǫ/k-differential privacy, by the group privacy property, there is
The proof is complete.
One needs to be reminded is that the results of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 are not reversible. When the sources are independent, there may exist mechanism which satisfies ǫ-identity differential privacy but does not satisfy ǫ-differential privacy. This can be known from the equation (18) (18) hold. Proposition 3 has the similar problem. When the sources are independent, ǫ-differential privacy and ǫ-identity differential privacy are not equivalent. This would make us to take a sceptical attitude to the ability of ǫ-identity differential privacy to protect privacy. However, this is a misunderstanding. We will give evidence of the ability of identity differential privacy model to protect privacy from the information theory in Section 5. On the contrary, the non-equivalence may not be the weakness of identity differential privacy but be its merit: more flexible than differential privacy model. This is because of letting
being very small may not have significant difference for the privacy protection level from the case of ratio less than e ǫ . After all, these events happen with very small probabilities. Therefore, the flexibility would give the identity differential privacy model more opportunities to improve the utility of outputs than differential privacy model.
Similarly, when the sources are dependent, ǫ-differential privacy and ǫ-identity differential privacy are not equivalent, which may also not be the drawback of the later compared to the former but the merit of the former. For example, the Black Death in the 14th century and the SARS coronavirus in [2002] [2003] show that most people of the world are dependent. If using the group privacy method, differential privacy model will add large noise. However, since these events are rare events, the identity differential privacy can add relatively smaller noise by the probabilities of these events, which shows the flexibility of identity differential privacy.
We now explain how the ability of differential privacy to protect privacy is weakened when the sources are dependent for general problems. We first give a lemma.
and min i,j∈{0,...,k}
Moreover, the bounds of the above inequalities are reachable.
Proof. The equation (21) is an immediate corollary of Lemma 2. The proof of the equation (22) is immediate and is omitted.
When applying the Lemma 3 to the equation (11), we have min
≤ max
and min
.
(24) The equation (23) denotes the extreme values of the left side of the equation (11) when the sources are independent. The equation (24) denotes the extreme values of the left side of the equation (11) when the sources are dependent. We can find that the extreme values in the equation (23) is determined by the probabilities of two neighboring sequences. However, the extreme values in the equation (24) is determined by the probabilities of two sequences not limited to be neighbors, which would be the immediate cause of weakening the privacy guarantee of differential privacy when the sources are dependent.
The Information-Theoretic Foundation of Identity Differential Privacy
In this section, we give strong evidences of the ability of identity differential privacy model to protect privacy by information theory. We will discuss the information theoretic properties of identity differential privacy model. Before presenting our main results, we present a useful lemma.
Lemma 4.
If the mechanism M satisfies ǫ-identity differential privacy, then for any source X i , any r ∈ R and any record t ∈ X i , there are
Proof. Since M satisfies ǫ-identity differential privacy, by Theorem 1, we have
By Lemma 2, we have
The another inequality can be proved similarly. The proof is complete.
In information theory, the relative entropy is used to measure the distance between two probability distributions [22] . The relative entropy of X i and (X i |Y = r), denoted as D(X i (X i |Y = r)), has the following result.
Theorem 2. Let the mechanism M satisfies ǫ-identity differential privacy and let Y be the output random variable of the mechanism. We have
Proof. By Lemma 4, we have
Theorem 2 shows that, if the mechanism M satisfies ǫ-identity differential privacy, the distance between the probability distributions of X i and (X i |Y = r) is no more than ǫ. Since ǫ-differential privacy is a special case of ǫ-identity differential privacy, we have the following corollary. Corollary 1. Let the mechanism M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy and let Y be the output random variable of the mechanism. Let the sources X 1 , . . . , X n be independent. We have
The mutual information is used to measure the amount of information that one random variable contains about another random variable [22] . We have the following result about the mutual information of X i and Y , which is denoted as I(X i , Y ).
Theorem 3. Let the mechanism M satisfies ǫ-identity differential privacy and let Y be the output random variable of the mechanism. We have
Proof. By the definition of the mutual information [22, p. 18] and Lemma 4, we have
Theorem 3 shows that, if the mechanism M satisfies ǫ-identity differential privacy, then the mutual information of X i and Y is no larger than ǫ. Since ǫ-differential privacy is a special case of ǫ-identity differential privacy, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Let the mechanism M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy and let Y be the output random variable of the mechanism. Assume the sources X 1 , . . . , X n are independent. We have
Remark 1. From the proofs of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 we can see that, if M does not satisfy ǫ-identity differential privacy, the relative entropy D(X i (X i |Y = r)) and the mutual information I(X i ; Y ) may out of the control of the upper bound ǫ.
The paper [19] discusses the relation of the conditional mutual information I(X i ; Y |X (i) ) and differential privacy. We have the following result, which is the same as in [19] . Proposition 4. Let the mechanism M satisfies ǫ-identity differential privacy and let Y be the output random variable of the mechanism. We have
Proof. We have
One should be emphasised is that Proposition 4 is irrelevant to the dependence of the sources. This implies that the conditional mutual information I(X i ; Y |X (i) ) could not capture the characteristics of the problem of dependent sources in differential privacy. In this respect, Definition 3 has dominated advantage to the conditional mutual information I(X i ; Y |X (i) ) [19] in treating dependent sources.
Parameter Setting and Achieving Identity Differential Privacy
In this section, we first consider how to set the parameters of identity differential privacy model, i.e., how to set the conditional probabilities {Pr[X (i) = x (i) |X i = t]} in the equation (11) . This is challenging since the probability distribution F of the dataset random variable X is unknown in reality. This problem is common for almost all of the models about dependent sources problem in differential privacy [17, 12, 11, 14, 9, 16, 26, 10] . A probabilistic model is needed to estimate these probabilities. As noted in [11] , the techniques in [27] would be one possible way to set these probabilities.
Achieving Identity Differential Privacy
Now, we discuss how to achieve identity differential privacy. Proposition 3 implies that one can use the group privacy property of differential privacy to achieve identity differential privacy. However, as discussed in 1, this will add to much noise to results. We now explore new methods to achieve differential privacy with less noise. First, we present a lemma.
Lemma 5. Let X = (X 1 , . . . , X k ) be the sources. For any i ∈ [k] and any
. Assume that, for any t, t ′ ∈ X i and any 
Proof. For any i ∈ [k] and any x
We have
= exp(ǫ/k) ×
where the inequality (35) is due to the fact that M satisfies ǫ/k-differential privacy and the group privacy property of M, the inequality (36) is due to Lemma 1, and the inequality (38) is due to the inequalities ǫ(1 − 1 k ) ≥ b and
We then have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) be the sources. Assume that, for any one source X i , there are at least n − k sources in X which are independent to X i . For any i ∈ [n] and any
Assume that, for any t, t ′ ∈ X i and any
Let the mechanism M satisfy ǫ/k-differential privacy and let ǫ(1 − Theorem 4 implies that, even if the maximum number of dependent sources k is large, there are differentially private mechanisms which can achieve identity differential privacy with noise magnitude far less than the group privacy based method so long as the dependent extent of the sources are low, i.e., η is small or b is large.
Related Work
In differential privacy, the paper [8] is the first to point out that dependent sources will weaken the ability of differential privacy to protect privacy. As noted in Section 1, there are mainly two directions to treat the dependent sources problem: the group privacy method and the bayesian inference method. The group privacy method is firstly used in the paper [17] , where the dependent sources problem is treated by the group privacy property of differential privacy and by magnifying the global sensitivity of query function, i.e., if there are at most k sources are dependent, one can alleviate the influence of dependent sources to decrease the privacy guarantee of differential privacy by achieving ǫ/k-differential privacy or by multiplying k to the global sensitivity of the query function. The group privacy method is consistent with the result of Proposition 3. However, the shortcoming of the group privacy is also obvious: the method assumes there must be limited numbers of dependent sources, while the assumption is too strong to be hold in reality. Moreover, the small world phenomenon [28, 29] also shows the dependence among people. These facts show that, if using group privacy method, there will add too much noise to results of mechanism. In order to alleviate the shortcoming of the group privacy method, the paper [12] and the paper [11] introduce the notions of "correlated sensitivity" and "dependence coefficient", respectively. The two notions can be explained as introducing a dependent coefficient (which is much less than 1 in general) between two sources to decrease the increasing speed of the global sensitivity of the query function. Although the two notions can add less noise than the group privacy method, the privacy guarantee of the two models are mainly based on the intuitions and have no theoretical guarantee. On the contrary, the identity differential privacy model is based on the information theory as discussed in Section 5 and therefore has strong theoretical foundation. Furthermore, the identity differential privacy model can accurately represent the dependent sources according to the conditional probabilities. It seems be more flexible than differential privacy model. For example, since the Black Death and the SARS coronavirus events are rare events, they will have very small effect to the inequality (11) since they have very small probabilities. This makes our model to allow the ratio of the probabilities of the outputs of two neighbors be much larger than e ǫ , but still satisfies ǫ-identity differential privacy. The model in [17] has no such flexibility.
As noted in Section 1, another method to treat the dependent sources problem is the Bayesian inference method [14, 9, 16, 26, 10] . In this method, the background knowledge of adversaries are modeled as a probability distribution (or a set of probability distributions) over the dataset universe D. The intention of the method is to limit the ability of adversaries with some special background knowledge, such as the knowledge about the dependent sources, to infer the private data of individuals. This is different from the intention of the differential privacy model, whose intention is to limit the leakage of personal information and whose model has no difference to different adversaries. The intention of our model is coincident with differential privacy, both for limiting the leakage of personal information and the corresponding model has no relation to the background knowledge of adversaries. Therefore, the models in [14, 9, 16, 26, 10] are based on the Bayesian inference theory whereas ours is based on the information theory. One advantage of the Bayesian inference method is the flexibility of designing different policies to different adversaries with different background knowledge. However, its disadvantage is the poor ability of inheriting the results of differential privacy, which makes it be hard to be achieved [14, 9, 16, 26, 10] . Our model can inherit almost all of the mechanisms of differential privacy since it has differential privacy model as its special case. Furthermore, our model can accurately explain the weakness of differential privacy model when treating dependent sources as in Section 4. The papers [15, 9] introduce their models according to the intentions of viewing the privacy guarantee to be the untraceability of sources. The two models share the same disadvantage as the Bayesian inference method: do not inherit most of the mechanisms of differential privacy and therefore is hard to be achieved.
There are many works to construct privacy model by the information theory. Our model is similar with the ǫ-information privacy [30] , which is defined as
Pr[X=x|Y =y]
Pr [X=x] ≤ ǫ, and with the ǫ-divergence privacy [31] , which can be explained as I(X; Y ) ≤ ǫ. All of the three models construct privacy model by the information theory. However, both of the models in [30, 31] use the universe of the information sources X but not the X i , which makes their models can't treat the dependent sources problem. The paper [19] relates differential privacy with the conditional mutual information I(X i ; Y |X (i) ), where I(X i ; Y |X (i) ) is proved to be weaker than ǫ-differential privacy but stronger than (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. As noted in Section 5, I(X i ; Y |X (i) ) can't capture the features of dependent sources problem. The paper [18] uses the mutual information I(X, Y ) to discuss the relations among mutual information privacy, identifiability and differential privacy. It also uses the universe of the sources X but not a source X i to construct model. The paper also discusses the relation between privacy definition and the rate distortion theory. The paper [32] relates the utility function in Exponential mechanism to the rate distortion function and then discusses the relation between information leakage and privacy. Another kind of work for treating differential privacy via information theory is to measure the bound of noise complexity of differential privacy [33, 34] . Above all, all of the above works about information theory do not treat the dependent sources problem of differential privacy. Our model uses the relative entropy D(X i (X i |Y = r)) and the mutual information I(X i ; Y ) to treat the dependent sources problem of differential privacy. The results in Section 5 show that the identity differential privacy model can ensure the personal information leakage upper bounded by a small value ǫ.
The privacy models in [35, 36] are also different from ours.
From the above discusses, we can conclude that the identity differential privacy model is the best to be consistent with all of differential privacy, the dependent sources problem and information theory.
Conclusion and Future Work
The results of this paper show that the information theory is very suitable to model the dependent sources problem in differential privacy. This is natural since information theory has very mature tools to capture the meaning of dependence of one thing to others.
Our model can explain most of the problems induced by the dependent sources problem in differential privacy. It is currently unknown whether our model resists other kinds of attacks and whether it introduces other privacy leakage. In any case, we believe that the dependent sources problem will greatly deepen the connection between information theory and differential privacy.
How to design mechanism that can adapt to the probabilities in the equation (11) is worth to be explored, which may be one challenging but promising field of the crossover study of information theory and differential privacy.
